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A rmed non-state actors are currently involved as fighting par-ties in conflicts all over the world; hence, for a true univer-salization of the rules and principles of human rights and 
international humanitarian law, the involvement of NSAs must be 
considered. This is equally true for prohibiting the use of AP mines 
because NSAs currently employ these devices. As NSAs are part of 
the problem, any solution must include them. 
This article presents some of the main findings of a 2006 report, 
Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Volume II: A Global 
Report of NSA Mine Action,3 which maps and analyzes mine action 
by NSAs. The report is the second part of a wider project,4 following 
a 2005 report that focused on the negative aspects of the involvement 
of NSAs in the landmine problem.5 The 2006 report presents: 
• Some general findings concerning involvement by NSAs 
in mine action, separated into the five mine-action pillars: 
mine-ban advocacy (also including mine-ban policy),6 stock-
pile destruction, mine clearance, mine-risk education and 
victim assistance.
• The findings of an analysis of mine action globally by NSAs—
examining mine action, the advantages, difficulties and les-
sons learned.
NSA’s Involvement in the Five Mine-action Pillars
The report found practical mine-action examples in the areas of 
each of the five mine-action pillars. A total of some 50 groups was 
documented as involved in some type of mine action, which was more 
than expected. The mine-action activities recorded were not entirely 
conducted by non-state actors. They were also performed by indige-
nous organizations mandated by NSAs or conducted by independent 
local or international organizations but facilitated by NSAs. 
There are important differences in the numbers of NSAs in-
volved in the different mine-action pillars. The greatest numbers of 
NSAs were involved in activities related to the mine-ban policy—35 
NSAs have banned AP mines. Of these, 31 had signed Geneva Call’s 
Deed of Commitment,7 and at least an additional 14 had allegedly 
introduced some type of limitations (temporal or applied) to their 
mine use. At least six NSAs, all of them signatories to the Deed of 
Commitment, have reportedly been involved in promoting the mine 
ban to other non-state actors.
NSAs are rarely involved in stockpile destruction, although this 
has occurred in a total of 10 instances. Sometimes NSAs do not de-
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stroy stockpiles because they have not yet agreed to a 
total ban on AP mines. In some cases, the failure to de-
stroy their stockpiles has also been due to circumstances 
beyond their control—a lack of funds or non-coopera-
tion by a concerned state, for example.
Thirty-one NSAs have participated in mine clear-
ance and related activities. In 10 cases, these activities 
formed part of a mine-action program. The remainder 
participated on a spontaneous or ad hoc basis, involv-
ing activities such as clearing camps when leaving them, 
clearing mines on the request of the population and 
adopting policies to map the mines employed.
Few NSAs have been directly involved in large-scale 
MRE programs; four groups were conducting mine-risk 
education programs themselves and 12 were facilitating 
projects or programs. NSAs engage more frequently in 
ad hoc MRE by providing information about mines to 
civilians (14 cases documented).
NSAs have reportedly directly provided assistance to civilian victims of land-
mine accidents (in 20 cases) and have allowed or facilitated outside organizations 
to provide victim assistance in areas controlled by the NSAs (15 such cases were 
documented).8 While not always reported, it can be assumed that most NSAs gen-
erally provide their own combatant victims with assistance to the extent possible. 
Assessment of NSAs Involvement in Mine Action and Its Advantages 
Generally, NSAs that have banned mines are more likely to be involved in 
mine action than groups that have not. Some mine-action practitioners (as well 
as Action 46 of the Nairobi Action Plan)9 suggest that there should be greater 
support for mine-action activities when the concerned NSAs have committed to 
a mine ban.
There are different reasons why NSAs become involved in mine action. 
Recurring themes are humanitarian and development concerns and self-inter-
est. Community pressure is sometimes highlighted as a main factor. An NSA’s 
decision to engage in mine action could also be motivated by a combination 
of factors.
The primary benefits of mine action by NSAs are considered to be the same 
as those arising from other forms of mine action, i.e., principally humanitar-
ian and developmental. Nevertheless, the complementary effects of NSA mine 
action (employment and stability; peace-building; security and disarmament; 
and openness to discussing other humanitarian norms) are different, and these 
are often perceived to be as important as—or even more important than—the 
primary benefits of working with NSAs. In addition, the primary benefits for 
the population in an area controlled by or influenced by NSAs may be relatively 
more significant, given that these areas often greatly lack developmental and 
humanitarian activities.
The main factors that appear to make humanitarian mine-action organi-
zations regard involvement by NSAs as necessary, rather than merely desir-
able, are: 
• The group’s military training
• Its possession of information about the mines in the area (and possibly maps)
• Its links to the territory and the population
• The security and cost-effectiveness of working with these actors
Challenges, Tentative Solutions and Lessons Learned
The Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Volume II: A Global Report of 
NSA Mine Action3 report showed it is possible to work with NSAs in humanitar-
ian mine action, although various difficulties and challenges involved were identi-
fied. The following sections present some of the tentative solutions and lessons 
learned it found.
 Need to understand and adapt to the political and conflict situation. The 
report found the need for flexibility and understanding of the circumstances in 
which mine action by NSAs takes place to be particularly important. This open-
mindedness requires the situation be carefully analyzed in detail, taking into ac-
count local knowledge. 
Although it has sometimes been argued that a ceasefire, or even a peace agree-
ment, is a necessary condition for comprehensive mine-action operations, it is gen-
erally agreed that some mine-action opportunities may present themselves before 
the conflict ends. In fact, a step-by-step approach taking certain minimum actions 
may not only save lives, but also facilitates larger-scale mine-action activities fol-
lowing the cessation of hostilities.
Flexibility and adaptability are crucial features for security-related problems, 
a major concern for mine action involving NSAs. Mine-action organizations 
introduce new security procedures and use local guards to overcome such prob-
lems. Another possible solution, at least on a temporary basis, has been to work 
at a distance by training staff in a safer environment and undertaking other 
aspects of mine action that can be performed at a distance (e.g., certain parts 
of the survey). 
Need for cooperation by the concerned state. One of the main conclusions of 
a workshop on mine action in the midst of conflict held in Zagreb, Croatia, in 
2005 related to the allocation of legal responsibility for mine action in areas under 
control by NSAs. It was found that States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention 
Landmines and unexploded ordnance cleared by a non-state actor.
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are responsible for mine-action efforts undertaken in the parts of 
their territory that, while not under their control, are under their 
jurisdiction. Although a State Party can justify its failure to fulfill 
its mine-action obligations in the areas of its territory that it does 
not control, it is still bound to make “good faith” efforts to fulfill 
its Convention obligations.10
Lack of cooperation of the government is an often-cited difficul-
ty faced in mine action by NSAs. Bureaucratic and administrative 
barriers have frequently hindered equipment and staff from enter-
ing a country. In some cases, the government has completely halted 
mine-action activities, but more commonly, the state interferes and 
obstructs the work, stopping short of total non-cooperation. It should 
be noted, however, that in some cases the concerned states were very 
supportive of mine-action activities despite complex situations, and 
successful actions were undertaken without difficulties.
Need for capacity-building and training of NSAs. One major 
challenge to mine action by NSAs highlighted both by humanitarian 
actors and non-state actors is the lack of capacity and equipment. In 
many cases, there is a clear need for training and capacity-building 
in technical and operational capacity as well as management skills. 
This would be especially necessary if, as has been proposed, NSAs 
should assume greater responsibility for facilitating and coordinating 
operations. General capacity-building and training have also been 
suggested as ways to confront the problems of NSAs’ involvement in 
mine action that allegedly stem from the NSAs themselves—namely, 
lack of organization, lack of transparency and a predisposition to set 
biased priorities.11
In working with NSAs, it is important not only to stigmatize their 
use of mines and failure to participate in mine action but also to raise 
awareness and educate them about the need for transparency and ac-
tion. It’s a fine line. Too great an emphasis on stigmatizing NSAs 
could have the counterproductive effect of causing them to withdraw 
from dialogue about mine action.
Need for financial and priority control. Accusations of corrup-
tion arising out of the non-transparency of NSAs (although not nu-
merous) are being taken seriously by international nongovernmen-
tal organizations and agencies. Consequently, most international 
organizations and NGOs choose to maintain some kind of financial 
and/or priority-setting control. In some cases, the problem has been 
solved by setting up systems of strict, independent financial control. 
Such measures may also avoid unnecessary 
tensions between mine-action organiza-
tions and NSAs.
Need for increased support. In general, 
mine-action practitioners have found third-
party states and the international commu-
nity quite supportive of mine-action efforts 
involving NSAs, although not sufficiently 
so. Third-party actors could make greater 
contributions in raising funds and pressur-
ing non-cooperating states. Both the finan-
cial and political aspects of support are cru-
cial; however, despite the problems related 
to funding for NSA mine action, it has been 
argued some governments are only inter-
ested in supporting mine-action work with 
NSAs largely because of the expected peace-
building gains. It has also been claimed 
that humanitarian actors themselves ought 
to make greater efforts to convince govern-
ments of the need for mine action and the 
humanitarian benefits it brings.
Need for confidence-building, commit-
ment and cooperation. To work in difficult 
situations, mine-action practitioners need to 
build relationships of trust, not only with 
the NSAs, but also with the local communi-
ties and authorities. In some cases, a mine 
ban on behalf of the NSAs (such as the Deed 
of Commitment) would be crucial to ensure 
non-state actors’ cooperation with mine-ac-
tion organizations. Since some NSAs have 
begun mine-action activities on their own 
before enrolling in international programs, 
this may facilitate the commencement of 
such programs. Mine-action issues should 
also be included (but not exclusively) in ex-
ploratory discussions and peace negotiations 
between governments and NSAs. 
Implementing mixed demining teams 
(made up of NSAs and government forces), 
aimed at confidence and peace-building, is 
likely to require communication among all 
parties and leadership by an independent 
NGO to facilitate the process.
Need for transparency. One key prac-
tice to facilitate mine-action activities in 
difficult situations is transparency. By be-
ing open and clear about their activities, 
humanitarian actors can convince NSAs 
and concerned states of their neutrality in 
order to avoid security risks and accusations 
of “spying.” In return, NSAs and the con-
cerned state(s) also need to be transparent 
with humanitarian actors in order to maxi-
mize the benefits from mine action since 
restrictions on the sharing of information 
may cause delays or lead to the cancellation 
of operations. Humanitarian actors should 
also open with each other in order to solve 
common problems with joint solutions. 
Finally, the main parties (NSAs and states) 
Anki Sjöberg received her bachelor’s 
and master’s degrees from Södertörns 
högskola in Stockholm, Sweden. She 
is a doctoral candidate at the Graduate 
Institute of International Studies in 
Geneva, Switzerland. Sjöberg has 
authored The Involvement of Armed 
Non-State Actors in the Landmine 
Problem: A Call for Action, Armed Non-
State Actors and Landmines. Volume 
I: A Global Report Profiling NSAs and 
Their Use, Acquisition, Production, 
Transfer and Stockpiling of Landmines 
and Armed Non-State Actors and 
Landmines,5 and Volume II: A Global 
Report of NSA Mine Action.3 
Anki Sjöberg 
Research Coordinator  
Geneva Call 
P.O. Box 334 
1211 Geneva 4 / Switzerland 
Tel: +41 22 879 1050 
Fax: +41 22 879 1051 
E-mail: info@genevacall.org  
Web site: http://www.genevacall.org 
should ideally be as forthcoming as possible 
with each other in terms of sharing relevant 
information about mined areas and the 
progress of mine-action activities.
Need for organization and coordina-
tion. When strong NGOs serve as imple-
menting or intermediary agencies, the pro-
cess works. The donors provide the funding 
to the NGO, which works directly with the 
NSAs. It requires coordination, informa-
tion-sharing and open communication 
among all the parties.
Need to involve the local communities. 
Mine-action practitioners are increasingly 
working with local communities, notably in 
so-called community-liaison roles.12 NSAs 
are sometimes part of these local commu-
nities. When NSAs are involved in ad hoc 
mine-action activities, it is especially impor-
tant that mine-action practitioners deal with 
them by considering, consulting and includ-
ing them in the execution of the mine-action 
program to avoid tensions between interna-
tional/national and local efforts. In addition, 
involving NSAs in mine action is relevant to 
the issue of accountability, since the people 
who demine stay in the area afterwards and 
would therefore have a vested interest in the 
program’s success.
It can be beneficial to include affected 
communities in the processes of dialogue 
and negotiation with NSAs since their rela-
tionship with the NSAs allows the commu-
nity representatives to put pressure on the 
armed actors. However, it can also put the 
population at risk. In these cases, it is of the 
utmost importance to carefully analyze the 
situation and, if necessary, take measures to 
protect the communities or to limit their in-
volvement in NSA mine action.
Elements of Analysis
When considering involving NSAs in 
mine-action activities, there are some rel-
evant parallels that can be drawn to the 
involvement of the regular military in mine 
action. As for the regular armed forces, the 
political situation and the NSA’s link to the 
population determine whether:
• NSAs should be involved in mine ac-
tion during or after armed conflict
• It is more advantageous to work 
with demobilized rather than active 
NSA soldiers
• Civilian actors are preferred
Sensitive issues that need to be carefully 
considered in different conflict and post-
conflict situations include:
• Whether the population trusts the 
NSAs
• The nature of the relationships be-
tween the NSAs and other relevant 
armed actors in the area
• The possible outcomes of the actions
Conclusion
In conclusion, Armed Non-State Actors 
and Landmines. Volume II: A Global 
Report of NSA Mine Action3  shows it is 
possible to engage in humanitarian mine 
action with NSAs. Given the benefits of 
such engagement, it is important not to dis-
criminate against populations in areas under 
the control or influence of NSAs, which, as 
compared to populations in areas control-
led by a state, benefit less frequently from 
mine-action programs. The main conclu-
sion of the research is that engaging NSAs 
in mine action has significant benefits, since 
their involvement supports efforts to reduce 
the humanitarian impact of landmines and 
unexploded ordnance. 
See Endnotes, Page
This article is drawn from a report pro-
duced by Geneva Call, Armed Non-State 
Actors and Landmines. Volume II: A Global 
Report of NSA Mine Action,3 which was pub-
lished in November 2006. The report can be 
downloaded from Geneva Call’s Web site at 
http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm. Hard 
copies can be obtained by writing to info@ge-
nevacall.org. 
Members of the Polisario Front mine action team preparing for a stockpile destruction.
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